Behavioral determinants of cybersecurity have gained greater attention among information technology experts in recent years. However, drivers of risky cybersecurity behavior have not been widely studied. This exploratory study examines the extent to which risky cybersecurity behavior is predicted by factors of cybersecurity-related avoidance behavior. Self-reported risky cybersecurity behavior was examined in light of technology threat avoidance factors in a sample of 184 working adults in the United States.
In this study, we deployed scalable low-interaction honeypot in Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (AWS EC2) instance across six different regions to determine the current threat landscape as well as how knowledgeable and ingenious threat actors could be in compromising internet-facing ICS. This work is an extended version of our work published in 14th EAI International Wireless Internet Conference.
This chapter analyses how the European Commission defines ‘defence’ in the context of globalised technology markets before then showing how the Commission intends to balance civil, security and defence research when the EU is funding defence research projects.
The purpose of the research is to analyse the market for dual-use industrial products in Russia and to make a forecast of its development through the example of the machinery and technical products export. The factors that affect the functioning of the dual-use product market are highlighted, including gross domestic product, the volatility index, oil price, and the dollar index. A multiplicative dynamic series decomposition model was used to forecast the export of dual-use machinery and technical products. It has been established that the
export of dual-use machinery and technical products is characterised by a decrease in the medium-term forecast period (2020–2024). To intensify market development, priority areas for cooperation and expansion of joint projects in the military-industrial complex have been formulated.
The cyber realm is increasingly vital to national security, but much of cybersecurity is provided privately. Private firms provide a range of roles, from purely defensive operations to more controversial ones, such as active-cyber defense (ACD) and ‘hacking back’. As with the outsourcing of traditional military and security services to private military and security companies (PMSCs), the reliance on private firms raises the ethical question of to what extent the private sector should be involved in providing security services. In this article, I consider this question. I argue that a moderately restrictive approach should be adopted, which holds that private firms can justifiably launch some cybersecurity services – defensive measures – but are not permitted to perform others – offensive measures.
The war in Ukraine is the first conventional war to ever take place in an entirely connected information ecology. The internet has not been switched off. Mundane smart devices are ubiquitous. Soldiers and ordinary civilians are participating in the conflict in ways that have never previously been possible. This stretches participation beyond the information domain and the kinds of connectivity that shaped conflicts in places like Syria, Tigray and Mali. Now the smartphone is routinely being used by soldiers and civilians alike to geolocate enemy columns, control drones to range find for artillery, and produce and broadcast the damage assessment for online audiences to watch. Surveillance technology already makes it possible to track individual smartphone users. In times of peace these forms of surveillance are curtailed. During a conventional war, however, private organizations and governments have reason to circumvent peacetime legal conventions.
Cybersecurity is critical to the national infrastructure, federal and local government, military, industry, and personal privacy. To defend the U.S. against the cyber threats, a significant demand for skilled cybersecurity workforce is predicted in government and industrial sectors. To address this issue, National Security Agency and the National Science Foundation jointly funded GenCyber program to stimulate the K-12 students' interest in the cybersecurity field and raise their awareness of cybersecurity and safe online behavior. Purdue University Northwest has successfully launched four GenCyber summer camps in 2016 and 2017 to 181 high school students, with 51.3% underrepresented minority ratio (Africa American and Hispanics), and about 2:1 male to female ratio. We delivered GenCyber summer camp activities in the format of game based learning and hands-on labs.
The potential humanitarian impact of some cyber operations on the civilian population is enormous. It is therefore important to discuss the rules of international humanitarian law (IHL) that govern such operations because one of the main objectives of this body of law is to protect the civilian population from the effects of warfare. This article seeks to address some of the questions that arise when applying IHL – a body of law that was drafted with traditional kinetic warfare in mind – to cyber technology. The first question is: when is cyber war really war in the sense of ‘armed conflict’? After discussing this question, the article goes on to look at some of the most important rules of IHL governing the conduct of hostilities and the interpretation in the cyber realm of those rules, namely the principles of distinction, proportionality, and precaution.
In the ever-evolving landscape of cybersecurity, this year’s Global Cybersecurity Outlook provides crucial insights into the multifaceted challenges facing leaders across the globe.Looking ahead to the challenges of 2024, the report illuminates major findings and puts a spotlight on the widening cyber inequity and the profound impact of emerging technologies. The path forward demands strategic thinking, concerted action and a steadfast commitment to cyber resilience. This report invites leaders not only to recognize the hurdles but also to actively embrace the opportunities for positive change. It is a call for collective effort and innovation, urging leaders to work collaboratively towards a more secure, resilient and trustworthy digital future.
While the 2024 edition of the Global Cybersecurity Outlook highlighted the growing inequity in cyberspace, this year’s report shines a light on the increasing complexity of the cyber landscape, which has profound and far-reaching implications for organizations and nations.