This paper identifies three major trends that are likely to characterise dual use dilemmas in the near future: the diversification of dual use domains, the digitalisation of potential threats and the proliferation of
actors.

It first explains the concept of dual use and then offers analyses of collective knowledge and collective ignorance. It goes on to present a theory of collective responsibility, followed by four chapters focusing on a particular scientific field or industry of dual use concern: the chemical industry, the nuclear industry, cyber-technology and the biological sciences.

As robots are more and more leaving the protected lab environment, they are also more and more used for civil security and military use cases. Very often, these civil and military robotics development projects share large similarities and there is a substantial potential for dual use. In this paper, we will present and study three practical European projects where security field robots are being developed.

Developing and Regulating Dual-Use AI Technology: China, the US and the EU

Artificial Intelligence (AI) seems to be impacting all industry sectors, while becoming a motor for innovation. The diffusion of AI from the civilian sector to the defense sector, and AI’s dual-use potential has drawn attention from security and ethics scholars. With the publication of the ethical guideline Trustworthy AI by the European Union (EU), normative questions on the application of AI have been further evaluated. In order to draw conclusions on Trustworthy AI as a point of reference for responsible research and development (R&D), we approach the diffusion of AI across both civilian and military spheres in the EU. We capture the extent of technological diffusion and derive European and German patent citation networks. Both networks indicate a low degree of diffusion of AI between civilian and defense sectors.

The accumulating tensions between major space powers increase the likelihood of space conflict. Though outer space is widely militarized, presumably it has not been weaponized. However, the dual-use nature of space technology raises serious concerns about its utilization. The article reviews and compares chosen space systems and technology with the residual offensive capability that could be misused for malicious purposes and could be utilized as space weapons. Demonstrated space-related technology, namely space launch vehicles, small satellites, satellites as weapon platforms, information technology and active debris removal systems, have broad dual-use consequences that can eventually lead to the weaponization of outer space.

The digitalisation of critical infrastructure has increased the risk of large-scale cyber incidents. In contrast to the management of conventional emergencies by established civil protection organisations involving volunteers in Germany, few response capacities exist for these events. The concept of a volunteer force for cyber security could close this protection gap. However, such involvement also poses practical and ethical challenges. By conducting interviews with computer science students (N = 11), this paper analyses potential volunteers’ attitudes towards ethical implications of a cyber volunteer force, as well as practical aspects that might motivate or hinder their participation. A qualitative content analysis reveals that students are largely unaware of potential dilemmas connected to vulnerabilities handling and national cybersecurity interests. Ethical guidelines and means of motivating and encouraging potential volunteers are discussed.

This research closes existing gaps by studying the open source dual-use security software challenges that organizations should consider when using this technology. We utilize a triangulation approach with three independent data sources to conduct a detailed analysis of this phenomenon.

Regulation 2021/821 of 20 May 2021, which sets up a European Union (EU) regime for the control of exports, brokering, technical assistance, transit, and transfer of dual-use items, enters into force on 9 September 2021. While the main features of the EU’s dual-use regime remain the same, Regulation 2021/821 introduces some novelties. Export control is extended to technical assistance.

the policy paper explores the rationale for investing in the so-called dual-use research and technology (R&T) to support Estonia’s national defence, civil security and public safety policy objectives. In addition, it investigates which areas of knowledge and technology generally have
the greatest potential for an inter-agency approach and which of those areas are most relevant to Estonia’s defence, security and safety organisations. It also considers a variety of business models for pursuing the inter-agency approach to R&T and its application in Estonia.