This paper examines the significance of ML in the field of cybersecurity, with a special emphasis on the identification of threats and the implementation of protective measures. By incorporating ML algorithms into cybersecurity frameworks, organisations may automate decision-making processes, facilitating prompt responses to ever-changing threats. Lastly, the paper covers the obstacles and ethical issues related to the adoption of ML in cybersecurity. Issues like as adversarial assaults, skewed datasets, and the interpretability of ML models are examined, highlighting the necessity for a holistic strategy that integrates modern technology with ethical considerations.

This study aims to investigate the metaheuristics applied to optimize artificial intelligence techniques in the detection of threats or optimization of attacks by using specific measures: detection or attack technique, purpose and the type of metahauristics involved.

The chapter addresses the Information Security Management System (ISMS) establishment approach, ensuring necessary controls to avoid widespread cybersecurity threats nowadays. The most common attack vectors and techniques of the last three years were analyzed in this chapter to define a set of information security practices, which can minimize risks related to modern cybersecurity threats.

this paper deals with military mobility, which in recent years has become one of the strategic priorities for both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU). The authors argue that the ability to quickly transport soldiers and military equipment over long distances across member states’ territories is a prerequisite for an effective and rapid military response by the allies. An analysis of the achievements to date shows that the European Union is one of the key actors in identifying and eliminating existing barriers and initiating necessary infrastructure construction. Simultaneously, close cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in this area allows the parties involved to achieve synergies.

This Chapter discusses the possible problems arising from the application of the principle of distinction under the law of armed conflict to cyber attacks. It first identifies when cyber attacks qualify as ‘attacks’ under the law of armed conflict and then examines the two elements of the definition of ‘military objective’ contained in Article 52(2) of the 1977 Protocol I additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions on the Protection of Victims of War.

In recent years, both academia and industry in cyber security have tried to develop innovative defense technologies, expecting that to change the rules of the game between attackers and defenders. The authors start by analysing the root causes of security problems in cyberspace: (i) vulnerabilities in cyber systems are universal; (ii) current cyber systems are static, predictable and monoculture which allows adversaries to plan and launch attacks effectively; (iii) existing techniques cannot detect and eliminates attacks employing unknown vulnerabilities. Based on their analysis, they develop a novel defense framework, mimic defense (MD), that employs ‘dynamic, heterogeneity, redundancy (DHR)’ mechanism to defense cyber attacks.

In term of operation based cyber-security exercise these teams include in general:
1. White team: A team that creates or generates a cyber-security exercise environment.
2. Red team: A team that attacks the cyber-security exercise environment.
3. Blue team: A team that defends the cyber-security exercise environment

Yet, despite this emphatic recognition of the importance of transparency, the activities of government and private sector actors involved in the development, sale, and export of Offensive Cyber Capabilities (OCC) remain cloaked in secrecy regardless of the sector’s role in facilitating human rights abuses. In this article, we tackle this broader challenge of secrecy via a case study on the export of dual-use technologies. We theorize why secrecy has been so prevalent in the OCC sector. We consider the role of different forms of secrecy—such as commercial secrecy and opportunistic secrecy by governments—in facilitating this situation.

One of the main security concerns of enterprise-level organizations which provide network-based services is combating with complex cybersecurity attacks like advanced persistent threats (APTs). The main features of these attacks are being multilevel, multi-step, long-term and persistent. Also they use an intrusion kill chain (IKC) model to proceed the attack steps and reach their goals on targets. Traditional security solutions like firewalls and intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPSs) are not able to prevent APT attack strategies and block them. Recently, deception techniques are proposed to defend network assets against malicious activities during IKC progression. One of the most promising approaches against APT attacks is Moving Target Defense (MTD). MTD techniques can be applied to attack steps of any abstraction levels in a networked infrastructure (application, host, and network) dynamically for disruption of successful execution of any on the fly IKCs.