In this paper I examine the issue of cybersecurity in the context of the conventionally understood ends of the military. I start out by demonstrating that the use of military capabilities to deal with cyberthreats creates a number of headaches for conventional ethical approaches to conflict, especially just war theory. I describe a number of cases that give us cause to question the validity of cyberweapons as a legitimate military capability. And I argue that the current development of cyberweapons, and their emerging use, is a significant challenge for conventional military ethics. Then I describe three specific moral problems for the military when it comes to using cyberweapons. First is the ‘threshold’ problem which is the concern that cyber weapons will lower the threshold for resorting to war. Second is the ‘collateral harm’ problem which is the concern that cyberweapons increase the likelihood of civilians being deliberately targeted and/or becoming victims of disproportionate attacks on dual-use infrastructure. Third is the ‘accountability’ problem because of the difficulty of holding accountable military personnel or their governments for the use or misuse of a weapons system. Next I argue that conceptions of the military as an institution whose sole purpose is to ‘kill people and break things’ acts to compound the moral problems as I outline them above.

This chapter focuses on a specific aspect of EU cybersecurity policy: the case of EU cyber defence. Indeed, the EU has started to invest normative and institutional efforts in cyber defence over the last decade, which offers an interesting case as cyber threats rely on dual-use technologies. In this regard, the chapter assesses whether there is a European specificity in the framing of European cyber defence to build a response to new threats emerging from the cyberspace and to the global challenges raised by dual-use Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) in military missions. 

Over the last decades cybersecurity has become a cornerstone of European digital development. Alongside with the diffusion of information and communication technologies and the deepening (as well as widening) of the European Union, the initial narrow and sectoral data security policies have expanded into a comprehensive cybersecurity framework addressing issues from resilient infrastructure and technological sovereignty, through tackling cybercrime, to cyber defence capabilities and responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. In this complex web of interrelated policies a relative newcomer at the European Union (EU) level is cyber diplomacy. Sometimes also called public diplomacy 2.0, it factors into the cross-border connectivity of cyberspace and reflects a shift in international relations where the lines between external and internal policies, military and civilian domains are blurred. However, the term cyber diplomacy is fluid and it is not well understood which topics should be under its “umbrella”, in particular in relation to cybersecurity, where it seems to be linked the most. This article aims to map existing and proposed instruments that make up the EU’s arsenal in this broad context to answer the following questions: what is cyber diplomacy and how is it related to the EU cybersecurity? Is cyber diplomacy in the EU becoming something in its own right as a distinct set of tools to secure the EU policy objectives? © 2021 The authors. All right reserved.

this paper looks at the possibilities for the EU in this domain and argues that at a time of American diplomatic and political retrenchment from Europe and the world, it has an opportunity to play a leading role in global cybersecurity policy and governance.

In the last decade, the EU’s policy on cybersecurity has changed significantly, both as to its referent objects and priority level. While the 2013 Cybersecurity Strategy focused almost exclusively on the importance of cybersecurity for the proper functioning of the single market, its 2017 version also contained an analysis of malicious cyber activities that threaten the political integrity of Member States and the EU as a whole. As the field’s level of complexity grows and forward-looking initiatives are constantly being proposed in order to promote cyber resilience across the EU, it is increasingly challenging the Union in the process of coordinating and implementing the planned actions. Cybersecurity has also become a national security issue entangling private and public, external and internal, civilian, and military issues making it necessary, but very challenging to widen and deepen ties among stakeholders in the EU.

Brief summarizes the discussions and offers recommendations to address the most pressing issues on the EU–NATO cyber agenda. Three Challenges to Better Cooperation: 1. Lack of Shared Situational Awareness and Information Sharing; 2.Uneven Levels of Preparedness and Cyber Resilience; 3.No Joint Cyber Exercises, Training, and Education

The new Global Strategy should provide the overall direction for the European Union's foreign and security policy in a world of multiple and complex challenges and threats. A stronger Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is indispensable for a secure Europe and necessary to underpin the EU's role as a security provider. However, without credible armed forces the EU will remain a paper tiger.

This paper analyses the current state of play, and some actions proposed to foster synergies between security- and defence-related research, focusing on a preparatory action (PA) and a pilot projectin support of CSDP-related research.

The acceleration of cyber-attacks in recent years has negatively impacted the overall performance of organizations around the world. Organizations face the challenge of enhancing their cyber security to prevent and combat cyber-attacks, but studies of factors impacting the cyber security awareness/readiness of organizations from a holistic perspective are lacking. This study adopts the Technology-Organization-Environment (TOE) framework to examine a comprehensive set of factors influencing the cyber security readiness of organizations and the effects of these factors on organizational performance (financial and non-financial) mediated by improved organizational security performance. Data are collected via a survey of IT professionals in Bahrain, with 270 valid responses.

Dual-Use Research of Concern articulates research and innovation that is intended to provide useful knowledge, information, or products; however, it could also be misused to present existential risks to society, with broad potential consequences. Thus far, it has been considered in
the context of nuclear and biological research, however, the principles can be applied to other fields.