China has largely been cut off from direct transfers of military systems and technologies since the announcement of the EU arms embargo in 1989. Nevertheless, the EU and its member states remain a major source of high technologies for China, namely, by means of trade, investment, and scientific cooperation.

This playbook outlines three guiding principles to support manufacturing and supply chain leaders in establishing a culture of cyber resilience throughout their organizations.The playbook suggested in this paper serves as a pragmatic framework to enable businesses to navigate strategic, organizational, operational, technical and regulatory challenges – and will foster a robust culture of cyber resilience that can effectively counteract both current and future threats

The importance of a sound governance model for the implementation of the National Cybersecurity Strategies (NCSSs) has been highlighted in numerous testimonies of the Member States as well as included in the NIS and NIS2 Directive. However, each country deploys its own governance model with a different level of maturity. ENISA, taking on its mandate to support and promote the development, deployment and implementation of the NCSS and accompanying governance models, produced this study on "Building Effective Governance Frameworks for The Implementation of National Cybersecurity Strategies". It analyses existing governance models to share a set of good practices when developing a governance model and putting in place the different governance elements. The proposed governance model consists of four layers with 10 sub-categories, and provides a total of 28 good practices: - Political governance - Political processes; - Roles and responsibilities; and - Legal measures. - Strategic governance - Strategy itself and its implementation; and - Risk identification and mitigation. - Technical governance - International standards and technical guidelines; and - Use of technology, tools and certification schemes. - Operational governance - Awareness raising; - Incident response; and - Information sharing. The good practices have been defined based on data collected through desk research and interviews with experts and relevant stakeholders from the Member States. The data collected has been analysed to identify trends, and effective instances across the different elements of governance. While the interviews had a European focus with 19 interviews with stakeholders from 18 EU Member States, the geographical scope of the desk research includes a global outreach. Finally, this report provides insights on KPIs and general indicators to monitor and evaluate the status of implementation of the NCSS and its governance model.

we present a conceptual framework for structured comparisons across the fields of biological immunity and cybersecurity, by framing the context of defense, considering different (combinations of) defensive strategies, and evaluating defensive performance. Throughout this paper, we pose open questions for further exploration. We hope to spark the interdisciplinary discovery of general principles of optimal defense, which can be understood and applied in biological immunity, cybersecurity, and other defensive realms.

We discuss ways in which an ostensibly military cyberattack could accidentally hit a civilian target. Civilian targets are easier to attack than military targets, and an adversary may be tempted to be careless in targeting. Dual-use targets are common in cyberspace since militaries frequently exploit civilian cyber infrastructure such as networks and common software, and hitting that infrastructure necessarily hurts civilians.

The cyber threats facing America have escalated sharply in recent years and has emerged as a clear and present danger to the nation's homeland and national security, economic prosperity, intellectual capital, and critical infrastructure. In the face of such persistent and escalating cyber threats, the United States is determined to immediately develop the capability necessary to counter this threat. A key component of the national cybersecurity strategy includes building a qualified cybersecurity workforce with the competence, knowledge, and technical skills. The cyber workforce must be capable when necessary to not only respond to, effectively counter, and eventually prevent the occurrence of cyber attacks. This paper argues that the U.S. has an untapped resource that will enhance its ability to meet the cybersecurity workforce requirements. That resource is the available military veterans who have served this country with distinction and honor.

In a world of ubiquitous connections, cybersecurity is everyone’s responsibility. Gone are the days when the actions of others had little impact on a person’s day-to-day activities. We are now completely digitally interdependent, meaning the actions of one individual can be the vulnerability that allows adversaries to target a so spot in the United States’ (U.S.) digital infrastructure. We argue a whole-of-society approach to cybersecurity is needed. The involvement of all members of society is required to defend against the scourge of cyber intrusions emanating from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. We do not promote individuals or corporations engaging in offensive cyber operations, but instead advocate that the U.S. already has a non-governmental model for citizen involvement in entities like the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), to adopt for cyberspace. We build on Estonia’s Cyber Defense League (CDL) organizational model and the works of others, advocating for establishing a Civil Cyber Defense (CCD) in the U.S. We conclude with specific actions this new entity could take to increase the overall cybersecurity posture of the U.S. and identify potential issues with our CCD concept.

Civil defence easily translates into concepts of comprehensive security in contemporary European thinking—especially since cybersecurity, defence, and national security considerations alike all rest on broad-based societal awareness, preparedness, and participation. This broad-based participation is central to the security of information and communication technologies, and to managing cyber incidents. This chapter puts in perspective the latest trends in EU cybersecurity regulation and highlight two formulas for integrating the civil entities into national and international cybersecurity efforts.

A clear lack of Civil-Military Cooperation is evident in the field of national cybersecurity policy. For a country such as Pakistan with fractious political, cultural, and diverse ethnic identities and ideological characteristics, an unguarded cyber domain can add to the existing rifts. In light of these challenges, Pakistan needs to create a national cybersecurity policy and strategy incorporating both civil and military concerns. The aim of this research paper is to find out a conceptual framework of Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) in the realm of cybersecurity. This study has used open-ended semistructured interviews to find out the way forward and the hindrances in civil-military cooperation to create a robust national cybersecurity regime

The first part of this article therefore focuses on whether militaries in their own national context contribute to defensive cyber security tasks. Common national challenges are identified, as are approaches that potentially improve cyber security through better civil-military cooperation. The article then examines the organisational structures in place across Asia and Europe to enable better international military cooperation for cyber related incidents.