In this paper, using comparative policy analysis, we examine the evolution of both security policies by tracing the historical development of U.S. regulation of cryptography as a dual-use good, and surveillance technologies, and practices used from the 1990s to today.

This report collects best practices, challenges, and opportunities for strengthening PPPs on cybercrime. To gather insights from the multistakeholder community, expert interviews and surveys focused on organizations’ knowledge of and experience with national and regional public-private collaboration to
prevent and fight cybercrime.

While the Internet has become an indispensable aspect of personal and professional lives, it has also served to render many individuals vulnerable to cybersecurity threats. Thus, the promotion of cybersecurity behaviors can effectively protect individuals from these threats. However, cybersecurity behaviors do not necessarily come naturally, and people need support and encouragement to develop and adopt them. A habit is an important factor that may motivate cybersecurity behaviors, but it has often been overlooked in past studies. To address this limitation, this study examined the formation of cybersecurity behavioral habits. Hierarchical regression analysis was used to analyze cybersecurity behavior survey data obtained from 393 college student participants.

The quest for substance, capability, and strategic autonomy goes on–or does it? Is the objective of CSDP territorial defence and strategic autonomy, or crisis management and softer security concerns like peacekeeping, border management, protection of shipping lanes, and/or cyber security? The Union needs to move beyond familiar complaints about the lack of common strategic culture and EU intrusion into NATO responsibilities. Geostrategic and economic imperatives dictate that the EU should progress CSDP beyond civilian crisis management in the EU Neighbourhood, and military training and security sector reform (SSR). The Strategic Compass must signal CSDP clarity of objectives, coherence, enhanced capability, and appropriate burden sharing with NATO. The response to the Strategic Compass must build European strategic autonomy in ways that strengthen NATO. For military strategic and economic reasons, both the EU and the post-Brexit UK need intensive cooperation to maintain their geostrategic relevance and strengthen the NATO alliance. This paper reflects on prospects for the EU Strategic Compass and offers timely analysis of recent trends in EU foreign and security policy and expresses cautious optimism regarding the enhanced European strategic autonomy/actorness. © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.

This article examines the notion of cyberattack-and-defend co-evolution as a mechanism to better understand the influences that the opposing forces have on each other.

Cybersecurity in consumer, corporate, and military settings, continues to be a growing concern in the modern and technologically driven world. As Wiederhold (2014) puts it, “the human factor remains the security’s weakest link in cyberspace.” A literature review related to human response to cybersecurity events reveals three phases involved in the cybersecurity response process, including: (1) Susceptibility, the phase preceding an event, which primarily encompasses behaviors that impact vulnerability to a cybersecurity event; (2) Detection of the event when it occurs; and (3) Response to the event after it occurs.

This paper provides guidelines to ensure cybersecurity in the operational technology (OT) environment, at a time of increasing digitalization and convergence of the OT and IT (information technology) environments.

this article illustrates how the term 'dual use' roots in a distinction between ‘peaceful’ and ‘non-peaceful’, or ‘civil’ and ‘military’ uses, and has gradually become associated with a broader dichotomy between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ purposes. Historically, this duality served not only to articulate the risks posed by certain technologies and indicate the rationale for their export control but also to justify their trade.

Anomaly detection aims at identifying unexpected fluctuations in the expected behavior of a given system. It is acknowledged as a reliable answer to the identification of zero-day attacks to such extent, several ML algorithms that suit for binary classification have been proposed throughout years. However, the experimental comparison of a wide pool of unsupervised algorithms for anomaly-based intrusion detection against a comprehensive set of attacks datasets was not investigated yet. To fill such gap, we exercise 17 unsupervised anomaly detection algorithms on 11 attack datasets.

The chapter describes these peculiarities and assesses distinguishing problems compared to selected verification measures for nuclear, biological and chemicals weapons technology. Yet, cyberspace is a human-made domain and adjusting its technical setting, rules and principles may help to reduce the threat of ongoing militarisation. Offering some alternatives, the chapter elaborates on suitable and measurable parameters for this domain and presents potentially useful verification approaches.