This study aims to explore existing studies of AI-based cyber attacks and to map them onto a proposed framework, providing insight into new threats. Our framework includes the classification of several aspects of malicious uses of AI during the cyber attack life cycle and provides a basis for their detection to predict future threats. We also explain how to apply this framework to analyze AI-based cyber attacks in a hypothetical scenario of a critical smart grid infrastructure.

The authors aim to clarify whether the existing rules are still completely applicable in the cyber context, and if needed, to find out what kind of improvements and clarifications can be made. Weighing in on these debates, we argue that despite the potential technical challenges and uncertainties, the principle of distinction should be applied to cyberspace. It should also be carefully re-examined and clarified from the standpoint of preventing over-militarization and maximizing the protection of the interests of civilians. For human targets, the elements of combatant status identified in customary international law and relevant treaties are not well suited to the digital battlefield.

In an ever-evolving cyber threat landscape, implementing a defense in depth strategy is essential for organizations to protect their assets, information, and operations. This comprehensive approach combines multiple layers of security measures, including perimeter, network, endpoint, data, identity and access management, application security, security awareness and training, and business continuity planning. By following best practices, such as conducting risk assessments, prioritizing investments, updating policies, monitoring and responding to incidents, and evaluating security measures, organizations can effectively mitigate risks and minimize the impact of potential security incidents. A well-executed defense in depth strategy fosters a security-conscious culture, contributing to the long-term success and resilience of the business.

To identify the KSAs needed for performing cybersecurity jobs, we administered survey interviews to 44 cyber professionals at the premier hacker conferences Black Hat 2016 and DEF CON 24. Questions concerned 32 KSAs related to cyber defense.

The World Economic Forum Centre for Cybersecurity – in collaboration with the Cyber Resilience Index working group and in partnership with Accenture – developed the global Cyber Resilience Index (CRI). Cyber Resilience Framework (CRF) and the Cyber Resilience Index (CRI). The CRI provides public- and private-sector cyber leaders with a common framework of best practice for true cyber resilience, a mechanism to measure organizational performance, and clear language to communicate value. The CRI is also a universal, impartial medium through which organizations in every sector around the globe can evaluate and engage with their ecosystem partners to create a more cyber-resilient digital network.

еhe world is witnessing a rise in cyber-related incidents. As information technology improves and the reliance on technology increases, the frequency and severity of cyber incidents escalate. The impact is felt globally, and South Africa is not immune to the effects. The country's fast-paced technological evolution continues to increase the attack surface within the cyber domain. The increased attack surface is confirmed by recent cyberattacks affecting well-known and established South African organisations.

Scholars have long recognized and debated the effects of the “security dilemma,” where efforts by states to enhance their security can decrease the security of others. The severity of a security dilemma, and the prospects for cooperation under the dilemma, are greatly affected by military technology. In this article, I apply the security dilemma framework to a revolutionary new form of conflict: cyberwarfare. I argue that cooperation over cyberwarfare is made challenging due to the security dilemma, and that the unique characteristics of cyberwarfare make it difficult to break out of this dilemma. The reluctance and failure of states to achieve cooperation over cyberwarfare likely reflects, in part, the constraints of this “cybersecurity dilemma.” Some states have strong incentives, however, to promote limitations on offensive cyberwarfare. Thus, I propose ways in which cooperation may eventually be achieved despite these challenges

The Cybersecurity Dynamics framework offers an approach to systematically understanding, characterizing, quantifying and managing cybersecurity from a holistic perspective. The framework looks into cyberspace through the dynamics lens because environments in cyberspace often evolve with time (e.g., software vulnerabilities, attack capabilities, defense capabilities, and cybersecurity states). The dynamics lens offers a unique viewpoint, which guides the modeling of the various situations which evolve with respect to cybersecurity. This type of evolution is driven by attackers, defenders, and users of related systems and is manifested by their attack/defense/use activities. Since its inception in 2014, there has been significant progress in characterizing and taming various kinds of cybersecurity dynamics. In this paper we discuss the landscape and way-of-thinking that guide the Cybersecurity Dynamics model, including two killer applications and the technical barriers that serve as outstanding open problems for future research.

In May 2009, the Obama administration released its, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications Infrastructure, which it expected would lay the groundwork for a new national cybersecurity strategy. Staking out separate policy development space, Congressional leaders began hearings and introduced legislation. The most significant – the Cybersecurity Act of 2009 – proposed major changes in current federal government approaches. The common starting point of all of these reform efforts is that current federal organization and current national cybersecurity policy is inadequate for the task of securing cyberspace.This article analyzes past federal reorganization efforts in response to the last technological revolution with serious national security implications – nuclear technology -- and the more recent response to homeland security. While much of the current cybersecurity debate leans toward radical reforming, we counsel an incremental approach to reorganization that builds on the hard work of the last decade combined with a genuine reconceptualization of the threat solution set.

The use of ICT in civil aviation has increased exponentially in the last years. Digitalisation and the technological tools and systems often connected to the internet constitute serious risks for aviation cyber security. The Government Accountability Oice (GAO) has recently stated that air traic management and control (ATM/ATC) vulnerabilities could be used to undermine national security. Against this backdrop, several related questions arise: what technologies do air traic management and control systems rely on? Are these systems vulnerable? Which actors could pose a threat to these systems? Do they have the technological skills to conduct attacks that could compromise them?