Secondary Title
JSTOR
Abstract
Examining assumptions about dependence and influence in the U.S. security cooperation enterprise.
Concluding remarks
• An importing state’s decision to transition from one arms supplier to another is based on cost-benefit judgements. A number of structural and practical variables raise the costs of seeking alternative sources of arms.
• The variables that increase the costs associated with transitioning from one arms supplier to another contribute to arms transfer dependency. These variables can range from issues related to international ideological alignments, challenges related to integrating incompatible capabilities, costs of adopting and sustaining new systems, readiness, or limited financial means.
• While states may pursue strategies to mitigate dependence, these strategies must be weighed against the benefits of closer alignment with an external patron.
• The variables that increase the costs associated with transitioning from one arms supplier to another contribute to arms transfer dependency. These variables can range from issues related to international ideological alignments, challenges related to integrating incompatible capabilities, costs of adopting and sustaining new systems, readiness, or limited financial means.
• While states may pursue strategies to mitigate dependence, these strategies must be weighed against the benefits of closer alignment with an external patron.
Reference details
Resource type
Miscellaneous
Year of Publication
2023
Publication Area
Cybersecurity and defense
How to cite this reference:
“If We Don’t Sell It, Someone Else Will”: Dependence and Influence in U.S. Arms Transfers. (2023). Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep48760