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Author(s):
Csaba Krasznay
Journal
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Abstract

The Russia-Ukraine war has clearly shown that critical infrastructures are prime targets for cyber operations in addition to the physical domain. In practice, in many cases, these critical infrastructures are protected by civilian cybersecurity companies in the context of a managed security service, so their defense operations must necessarily be coordinated with military defense activities. This includes among others the sharing of information classified under different classification systems (national, EU, NATO) between different actors in national cyber defense, the inclusion of appropriate civilian experts in the armed forces, and the usage of cutting-edge cybersecurity technologies (e.g. AI-enabled solutions) that are first introduced for civilian use, with military organizations only having access to them later or possibly not encountering them at all due to procurement difficulties. The main goal of this paper is to introduce the existing opportunities and obstacles to civilians’ involvement in military cyber operations in the areas of legislation, technology, and human resources from the European perspective. Moreover, the paper deals with the actual questions of cybersecurity intelligence sharing between civilian and military entities and the European Union’s actions in order to improve the overall cybersecurity posture of the region.

Concluding remarks
My hypothesis is backed up by a wealth of research and practical case studies.It is no coincidence that European policy has also recognized the importance of civilian military cooperation. However, as a conclusion to my study, to launch an academic debate and to support the detailed implementation of policy objectives, I would like to identify five key challenges that need to be addressed to enable private actors to cooperate effectively with the military. These are the following: ‒Challenge 1: The cyber defense of critical infrastructures is typically provided by civilian service providers that are not closely linked to military or civilian governmental cyber defense organizations, and therefore in specific situations, such as war, practical cyber defense of these critical infrastructures is not sufficiently effective. ‒Challenge 2: The majority of the best cybersecurity experts and the civilian companies that employ them have no connection to the military, which means that in a war situation, the protection of national cyberspace and potentially the effectiveness of active operations is not the most effective. ‒Challenge 3: Today’s information technology revolution, e.g. the emergence of artificial intelligence, opens up new perspectives in cyber security, but the application of these technologies in national cyber defense, whether military or civilian, will only become feasible after a longer period in medium-sized countries, which are therefore more exposed to cyber-attacks than other, larger and richer powers.‒Challenge 4: Information sharing on incidents is not only not working smoothly at the European level, but also at the national level, which is an obstacle to more effective national and European cyber defense. ‒Challenge 5: Only a fraction of the potential of bilateral and regional cybersecurity cooperation is exploited, and national cyber capability development typically does not take into account the experience of other countries.

Reference details

DOI
10.2478/raft-2024-0001
Resource type
Journal Article
Year of Publication
2024
ISSN Number
2247-840X
Publication Area
Dual-use cybersecurity
Date Published
2024-02-28

How to cite this reference:

Krasznay, C. (2024). The Role of Civilian Cybersecurity Companies in Military Cyber Operations. Walter de Gruyter GmbH. https://doi.org/10.2478/raft-2024-0001 (Original work published)