This study offers one way of understanding how NATO alliance obligations may be understood in the era of cy-ber operations. We demonstrate that the American pub- lic takes a cautious view of its alliance commitments, but nevertheless believes that it has at least some continuing obligation to come to the aid of its allies in response to cyberattacks. We acknowledge limitations of our study. Perhaps larger-scale studies of public opinion conducted using probability-based sampling could yield different results, even if this may be less likely than skeptics would assume ( Coppock and McClellan 2019 ). Perhaps the transat- lantic alliance rests on particular socialization into beliefs about alliance solidarity that render elite viewpoints dif- ferent from the mass public’s perspective. If foreign policy is also insulated from public opinion, then our study may have less policy relevance than we claim (although note that at the limit, such a claim is equivalent to stating that US foreign policy is not just un- but anti- democratic). Eu- ropean (and Canadian) audiences may perceive these fac- tors much differently than American ones—and the other allies, too, have a vote. Nevertheless, we believe that this study illuminates an important set of emerging challenges and clarifies the basis of public support for and under- standing of NATO commitments. Our research points to clear paths for future work. Cross-country studies could offer valuable information about how other countries view their alliance obligations and how relative power and the severity of attack af- fect their calculations. Further research could also ex- plore whether the American public discriminates between powerful and less powerful allies, or between NATO and non-NATO allies (or even between formal allies and ma- jor US security partners such as Saudi Arabia or Israel), in determining what its commitments mean. In any event, such work should be carried out before more serious cy- ber scenarios manifest in real life.