How far does the SC narrow differences in member states’ thinking regarding threats and capability needs, and how to address them? If it achieves that, it will have been worthwhile and could be a major step forward. Coherence and convergence between EU and member state defence aspirations is a minimum requirement. In summary, the EU defence role, and the ambition of the Union’s common security and defence policy, needs to be clarified. Is the CSDP ambition to respond to high intensity attacks, or instead to leave this to NATO, and for the EU to focus on civilian crisis management, peacekeeping, and defence of the global commons, such as the High Seas, space, and cyber security? What interpretation do member states put on Art.42.7 and mutual assistance? EU relevance to defence has always been handicapped by a lack of political will and capability, and a lack of coherence, and clarity. The SC needs to deliver where previous efforts have failed. The context is not reassuring, but a worsening and more complex threat environment demands a clear response. The SC will demonstrate that there is no alternative to a more resilient, more capable, and more strategic European Union. A positive sign is that the SC builds on steps already underway since 2016. As well as institutional initiatives referred to in this article, the Union has made significant strides towards a more effective instrumentation to enhance both security and defence, including capability development and defence industrial policy (Nunes 2018). There has been EU support for dual-use transportation infrastructure and capacities to counter hybrid threats such as manipulation of the information environment, attacks on critical infrastructure and election interference. There is now greater linkage between justice and home affairs and security and defence, assisting cross-border threats such as cyber-attacks, and irregular migration (Fiott and Lindstrom 2021, 4). Progress in these areas allows for cautious optimism that the SC will bring further tangible outcomes. The EU is moving beyond crisis management and capacity development, and the more comprehensive civilian-military approach is cause for optimism that member states and the Union as a whole are jointly committed to enhancing European security and defence. We have highlighted the integrated civilian-military approach as fundamental to the SC process. Fiott and Lindstrom (2021) emphasise the value in hybrid technology and capacities that address multiple threats, citing cyber security applications, sea-based assets, and space-based capabilities to monitor arms smuggling, piracy, illegal migration, and climate change. Member states must provide investment, while ensuring effective communication with citizens, vital to public understanding of the civil benefits, while also serving defence needs. There remains a legacy of economic stress from the 2008 financial crisis, from the euro-crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic, and EU-UK relations are rather poor. But with a worsening international situation and a raised level of external threat, there is a better understanding of shared interests among member states. These comprise territorial integrity, security of the Union’s external borders, resilience in the face of pandemics, food, water and energy security, environmental sustainability, the integrity and proper functioning of the single market, safe and secure communication networks, cybersecurity, combatting serious and organised crime, terrorism, and extremism, and more besides. Shared interests are after all what led to the SC being commissioned, and it has duly become a focus of attention for HR-VP Borrell, the EEAS, and the member states (Scazzieri 2020). The Union is therefore in a better position to undertake a hard-headed study of the conclusions from the SC process. It can then take the necessary steps to deliver on its demands and do so while consolidating and materially improving cooperation with multilateral partners, above all NATO, and with bilateral partners, notably the UK, but also the US, which will welcome decisive outcomes from the process. We have also argued that the effectiveness of the EU mission to secure its own interests through CSDP will be enhanced by a renewed commitment to the comprehensive approach. But the SC highlights both the lack of tools and weaknesses in the tools already available. The SC will highlight what needs to be done, and what should be prioritised. We also suggest that where the partnership element of the SC is concerned, European strategic autonomy with full engagement of the United Kingdom is a better and more capable prospect than EU strategic autonomy. UK involvement with PESCO in developing strategic enabling capability (Besch 2021), and full integration with the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base could deliver European capability, and European strategic autonomy where needed. This is essential given the geopolitical pressures facing the continent. A close EU-UK relationship will be difficult to achieve given the mood music around the UK’s departure from the Union in 2020, where even relations between Paris and London have suffered despite their close bilateral defenceties. Future UK governments may adopt a more emollient position in respect of relations with the EU. Ultimately a close security and defence partnership between the EU and the UK is in the joint interest of both.