Author(s):
Journal
Informa UK Limited
Abstract
An arms race in cyberspace is underway. US and Western government efforts to control this process have largely been limited to deterrence and norm development. This article examines an alternative policy option: arms control. To gauge whether arms-control models offer useful lessons for addressing cyber capabilities, this article compiles a new dataset of predominantly twentieth-century arms-control agreements. It also evaluates two case studies of negotiated agreements that regulate dual-use technologies, the 1928 Geneva Protocol prohibiting chemical- and biological-weapon use and the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation.
Concluding remarks
The analysis underscores the limits of norm development for emerging technologies with both civilian and military applications. It finds lessons for developing verifiable, international cooperation mechanisms for cyberwarfare in the regulatory model of international aviation. Conventionally, arms-control agreements take advantage of transparent tests or estimates of arms. To restrict cyberwarfare activities, experts and policy makers must adapt arms-control models to a difficult-to-measure technology at an advanced stage of development and use. Further investigation of international regulatory schemes for dual-use technology of similar diffusion and development to the internet, such as international civil aviation, is needed.
Reference details
DOI
10.1080/10736700.2018.1515152
Resource type
Journal Article
Year of Publication
2018
ISSN Number
1073-6700
Publication Area
Dual-use cybersecurity
Date Published
2018-05-04
How to cite this reference:
Dumbacher, E. D. (2018). Limiting cyberwarfare: applying arms-control models to an emerging technology. Informa UK Limited. https://doi.org/10.1080/10736700.2018.1515152 (Original work published)