@misc{87,
  title = {Cyber Security in Civilian Aviation: Insights for Advanced Nuclear
Technologies},
  abstract = {This report provides a brief overview of legacy avionics and the air traffic control system (ATS), describes the current Next Generation (NextGEN) ATS, the integrated modular avionics (IMA) of modern aircraft, and provide a list of potential cyber security (CS) issues and associated CS anectodotes/incidents. An overview of the civilian/commercial aviation industry regulatory framework and introduced CS measures and solutions are summarized. Finally, some short concluding remarks and discuss the relevance of aviation CS to nuclear CS are provided.},
  year = {2017},
  journal = {UCBTH},
  url = {https://fhr.nuc.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/UCB-TH-17-001-Cybersecurity-in-Civilian-Aviation.pdf},
  note = {In reviewing aircraft avionics and the migration to a fully networked fly-by-wireless architecture, several implications for CS can be identified. There is a very little to no analog
control envisioned in future aircraft other than for redundancy purposes. Civilian aviation regulations are starting to catch up with the CS issues, but threats remain a constantly evolving issue requiring constant vigilance and updating. In aviation, as in nuclear power, CS, physical
security, and safety need to be coordinated in a risk informed approach. The aviation sector has implemented security controls such as access control, contingency planning (including a human element), and physical security measures to buttress against potential cyber-attacks. Retention of back-ups, mitigations against spoofing, built-in cross-checks of surveillance data and encryption
provide assurance that the move to IMA will maintain a similar level of CS as for previous generation of digital avionics, while conferring added functionality and benefits. These approaches, if not already applied in nuclear I&C, can be adopted when and where applicable.},
}